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SHALL COLORADO PROCEDURE CONFORM WITH
THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE?
By HUDSON MOORE of the Denver Bar

OR some two or three decades the question of the adoption of a uniform civil procedure for all Federal District
Courts has been agitated. As you know, equity and law
cases now proceed by different routes. Equity cases are governed by some eighty-odd rules of practice in equity, promulgated from time to time by the Supreme Court, while law
cases to a large extent follow the practice of the state in which
the particular Federal court is located, as required by the conformity practice act (Revised Statute 914).
Considerable opposition to a change in this system, and
to the adoption of a uniform procedure for all civil cases, existed. Lawyers familiar with the practice in their own states
disliked the idea of the adoption of a procedure in the Federal
courts different from that with which they had become accustomed. The late Senator Walsh was a leader in this opposition.
However, the mills of the gods do grind, though slowly,
and in 1934, largely as a result of the long fight of the American Bar Association, assisted by some state bar associations,
including Colorado (Reports, 1913), the Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe by general rules the forms
of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the practice and
procedure in civil actions at law, so as to secure one form of
civil action for cases in equity and actions at law in the Federal
courts. Attorney General Cummings is entitled to much
credit for obtaining the immediate passage of the act.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court, after some delay, has
undertaken the preparation and promulgation of such a uniform system. To aid the court in this important task, it
called to its assistance an Advisory Committee composed of
some fourteen leaders of the legal profession. This committee has as its chairman Hon. Wm. D. Mitchell, former Attorney General, and as its reporter Hon. Chas. E. Clark, Dean of
the Yale Law School. The committee has labored diligently
and composed a simple, brief, yet complete set of practical
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which it submitted, with
the consent and approval of the Supreme Court, to the bench
and bar for consideration. The committee has attempted to
unite the English and best state systems and the substance of
many of the present equity rules into a civil code procedure,
and to produce a work which may, and should, become a
model of uniform civil procedure to all the states.
It was the desire of the committee to submit to the Supreme Court a final draft of the rules in time for the Supreme
Court to have acted prior to January 1, 193 7.
However, following a full discussion of the proposed
rules at the last meeting of the American Bar Association and
the receipt and consideration of many suggested changes the
Advisory Committee found itself unable to complete its work
within that time. The committee held its final session in
Washington, February 1st, and continued its sessions during
the next four days. Before final adjournment the committee
finished the consideration of every suggestion submitted by the
various committees and by individual members of the bench
and bar. The volume of suggestions and the extent of professional cooperation were extraordinary and have resulted in
some changes of substance and many of form in most of the
rules. These rules have been referred to a sub-committee on
style and form. It is now expected that the perfected rules will
be presented to the Supreme Court shortly and that the Supreme Court will act during the present year.
The act provides that such rules "shall not take effect
until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and
until the close of such session," the obvious purpose being to
give Congress the opportunity of legislating regarding the
rules, if it so elects.
Lawyers practicing in the code states have little cause for
objecting to the adoption of the proposed "Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure," the official title given to the rules.
It is not the purpose of this paper to review the proposed
rules at length. Those of you who attended the recent meeting
of the American Bar Association there heard the subject ably
discussed. The reporter, Dean Clark, discusses the rules in a
comprehensive article appearing in the July number of the
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American Bar Journal, and several recent articles in the Yale
Law Journal. My purpose is merely to call to your attention
a few of the important provisions and point out some differences which will continue to exist between the Federal rules
and our state practice, and to suggest a few changes so that
Colorado may take advantage of this model procedure.
The rules will effect a radical change in Federal civil procedure. The two most important changes are, substituting
uniformity for conformity to state practice, and abolishing
the distinction between equity and law practice and procedure.
The rules provide that there shall be only one form of action
and one mode of procedure. That form of action shall be
known
as "civil action" and the procedure shall be known as
"civil procedure,"
thus adopting the essence of similar provisions found in code practice in most of the states.
The rules in general provide for simplified and concise
pleadings, and permit service of process by individuals, all
very much in conformity with our code.
District courts are required to establish regular motion
days, at frequent intervals, thus correcting a defect in the practice in our Federal court.
Demurrers are abolished as a separate pleading, but may
be embraced in the answer and heard in advance of the trial
When the court permits, thus preserving the essence of equity
rule 29, and avoiding some lost motion and delay in joining
issue.
If you desire you may go fishing, by oral or written deposition, among your adversary's witnesses to your heart's content, for any reason or no reason, a departure from state practice. You may also examine your adversary under cross
examination, similar to state practice.
Rule 10 is of interest in that it provides that pleadings
shall be signed by an attorney, and need not be verified. The
attorney's signature is taken as a certification by him that to
the best of his knowledge there is good ground for supporting
it. For a wilful violation of the rule, as well as for the insertion of false, scandalous or indecent matter, the attorney may
be held in contempt of court.

The existing practice of requiring evidence to be reduced
to narrative form on appeal is abolished and the state practice
of filing the reporter's transcript is substituted.
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Motions for directed verdict, though made by all parties,
do not waive a jury where the motion is overruled, an improvement over our state practice.
The English practice, now in vogue in the Federal courts,
of ascertaining the qualification of prospective jurors, is retained. Proposed rule 53 provides that the court, in its discretion, may limit the examination of prospective jurors to
such questions as it shall propound to them, and refuse to permit the parties or their attorneys to examine the jurors directly.
The practice is that after qualifying questions are propounded
to the jury by the judge, he will ask any additional questions
submitted to him in writing by counsel which he deems pertinent and proper.
This practice is also in vogue in many states, and much
can be said in its favor. It expedites trials, saving time and
expense. It tends toward the selection of an impartial jury.
It gives the jury the impression that the judge is the director of
the progress of events, and not merely an umpire, refereeing a
contest between opposing counsel.
Some states, including Colorado, follow the practice of
allowing the attorneys to cross-examine the jurors to their
heart's content. This practice is supported by authority. In
an early case, that of Union Pacific Company v. Jones, 21 C.
340, Judge Hayt, speaking for the court but without the citation of any supporting authority, said: "Within reasonable
limits counsel have the right to put questions to jurors not
only for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not grounds
exist for challenges for cause, but also for the purpose of intelligently exercising their peremptory challenges." That case
has been followed in subsequent cases by our Supreme Court,
and is the settled law of this state. This system is frequently
abused by tiresome and tedious questioning of jurors, but at
least one authority supports it, saying: "The usual and better
practice is to allow counsel to conduct the examination under
the direction and supervision of the court." (35 C. J. 397.)
It is a system approved by many trial lawyers, who
assert that it gives them an opportunity of getting acquainted
with the jurors. Many years' practice in states adhering to
each system leads me to observe that the selection of a jury is
more or less an artless art. And I heartily agree with Chief
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Justice Burke, who, a decade ago, in an address before the
American Bar Association, on the subject of "Trial or Tournament," pointing out some of the defects in our jury system,
said: "Commit the examination of jurors to trial judges and
thus make the process of jury selection an earnest attempt to
find fair men, instead of a battle royal to impanel a prejudiced
tribunal."
A major difference in the Federal system and our practice
is that dealing with instructions to the jury.
As you know, Section 205 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides that: "Before the argument is begun the court
shall give such instructions upon the law to the jury as may
be necessary, which instructions shall be in writing and signed
by the judge."
Proposed rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
preserves the common law practice now in vogue in the Federal
courts, and that of courts of a great many states in providing
that, "The court shall instruct the jury after the arguments
are completed." Such instructions, of course, may be oral or
in writing, at the pleasure of the trial judge.
The origin of jury instructions is, to me at least, somewhat hazy.
Blackstone in commenting upon the age when the witnesses composed the jury says: "For the oath of the jurors
to find according to the evidence was construed to be, to do it
according to the best of their knowledge. This seems to have
arisen from the antient practice of taking recognitions of assize
at the first introduction of that remedy; the sheriff being
bound to return such recognitors as knew the truth of the fact,
and the recognitors when sworn being to retire immediately
from the bar and bring in their verdict according to their own
personal knowledge without hearing extrinsic evidence or receiving any direction from the Judge."
We know, however, that at an early date and probably
from the inception of jury practice, as it is today, it has been
the custom for the judge to give instructions to the jury, for
as far back as the Year Books go we find the court delivering
a charge to the jury.
The final development of the common law practice in
this particular is well stated by Blackstone to be: "When the
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evidence is gone through on both sides, the Judge, in the presence of the parties, the counsel, and all the others, sums up the
whole to the jury; omitting all superfluous circumstances, observing wherein the main question and principal issue lies,
stating what evidence has been given to support it, with such
remarks as he thinks necessary for their direction, and giving
them his opinion in matters of law arising upon the evidence."
Dean Roscoe Pound, commenting on the common law
practice, says: "The trial judge, after the arguments, charges
the jury, that is, addresses them orally, explaining the issue or
issues on which they are to pass, stating the law applicable
thereto, summing up the evidence on each side and, if he thinks
proper, discussing and commenting upon it."
The exercise of his common law powers in qualifying the
jury, summing up the evidence, after but not before listening
to the arguments of counsel; expressing an opinion regarding
the evidence, in exceptional cases; instructing the jury after
argument in an informal talk, and not by reading from cold,
formal type, regarding the questions involved and the applicable rules of law; by an able, upright judge, are all valuable
aids in producing a fair and just verdict.
However, these common law powers were not always
quietly acquiesced in by the Englishman. Thus, in the trial
of Colonel Lilburne for treason, about the middle of the 17th
century, that doughty defendant uttered a challenge which
delighted his fellow countrymen when he said to the court:
"The jury by law are not only judges of fact but of law also,
and you who call yourselves judges of the law are no more
but Norman intruders, and in deed and in truth, if the jury
please, are no more but cyphers to pronounce their verdict."
To which Mr. Justice Jermin, presiding, in wrathful defense of
the bench, replied: "Was there ever such a damnable, blasphemous heresy as this is, to call the judges of the law cyphers."
We shall see as we proceed that the Supreme Court of the
United States on one occasion, some one hundred and fifty
years later, fully justified Colonel Lilburne's characterization.
Many reasons have been advanced for the refusal of some
of the states to follow the English practice. During the 17th
century struggles between the courts and the Crown, juries
had proved an effective check upon the Crown, so much so
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that Blackstone credits English civilization, in a large measure,
to the jury system.
In the American Colonies the Crown judges were often
incompetent, and sometimes were laymen, ignorant of the
principles of the law.
Immigrants to America were well aware of the tyrannies
of Jeffreys and his ilk, as well as of the oppressions of the
Crown and servile judges holding office at the will of the
Crown, willing to do the Crown's bidding; hence our forefathers seemed more concerned in preserving the jury as a bulwark of political liberty than the making of it an efficient tribunal, with the result that the American development of jury
trial has tended to limit the authority of the trial judge and
increase the powers of the jury.
This tendency manifested itself to the extent that some
of the states, including Georgia, incorporated in their early
constitutions provisions to the effect that in all criminal cases
the jury should be the sole judges of both law and fact.
That doctrine, at least on one occasion, was extended to
civil cases by the Supreme Court of the United States. In the
case of Georgia v. Brailsford (3 Dallas 1: 1 Law Ed. 483),
being an original proceeding, tried to a jury in the United
States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Jay, with the approval
of the entire bench, instructed the jury in part as follows:
"The facts comprehended in the case are agreed: the only
point that remains is to settle what is the law of the land arising from those facts; and on that point, it is proper that the
opinion of the court should be given. * * * It may not be
amiss, here, gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule,
that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law it is the province of the court, to decide. But it
must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this
reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless
a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and
on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will
pay that respect which is due to the opinion of the court. For,
as on the one band, it is presumed that juries are the best judges
of fact; it is, on the other hand, presumable that the courts are
the best judges of law. But still both objects are lawfully
within your power of decision."
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Truly a supplicating appeal to the jury, by the most
powerful court in the world, to accept its advice as to the law,
and that in a case in which a verdict should have been directed.
On which occasion, the office of juror reached its zenith and
the office of the trial judge the very nadir of its functions.
The doctrine so announced in this case was so astounding
that as a precedent, it was permitted to remain in innocuous
desuetude until some sixty-odd years later, when a trial judge
had the temerity to refuse to follow it, naively remarking that
he doubted the accuracy of the reporter (U. S. v. Morris, F. C.
No. 15815).
Since the case does not appear ever to have been formally
overruled, one may wonder if the New Deal lawyers did not
overlook a point in not having the validity of AAA tested by
a jury composed of Western or Southern farmers.
Dean Clark truly says that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure attempt to follow and incorporate the English and
"best state systems." And that "We brought to our meeting
a real cross-section of procedural experience in this country."
The days of Jeffreys are no more. There are no Crowns
in America to fear. Our sole purpose should be to make the
jury system as efficient as possible.
In speaking of the advantages of oral instructions over
written, Judge J. Foster Symes, who has had broad experience
under both systems, observed: "Written instructions are not
always consistent, tend to be a collection of disjointed statements that do not blend together harmoniously, and the reading of them detracts from their value. Oral instructions are
more apt to engage the attention of the jury, carry more conviction and form a more harmonious whole."
Judge Frank McDonough, also an experienced trial
judge, when he was on the bench, preferred the state practice
of instructing the jury before argument, saying:
"I am -much in favor of the practice in Colorado of instructions
being given before arguments. My reasons are, briefly, that the jurors
gain their views of the law to be applied to the evidence at first hand
from the court's statement of the law, and such method prevents the
possibility of attorneys attempting to inject into their arguments incorrect statements as to what the law is or is not or ought to be."

However, it seems to me that the rule itself answers these
objections, in providing in substance that the court shall so far
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as practicable, inform counsel of its proposed action upon requested instructions prior to argument.
I believe the pendulum is swinging back, and the present
tendency is towards restoring to the trial judge his ancient and
proper functions. This is as it should be. I again quote Chief
Justice Burke, who said: "Restore to the trial judge his ancient right and duty to act as an advisor to the jury, without
which the jury system never was and never will be successful."
The right and power of the trial judge to qualify the
jury; to sum up the evidence at the conclusion of the argument, expressing an opinion upon the facts in exceptional
cases, when such an opinion would seem to be of aid to the
jury; explaining to the jury the issues and the principles of
law applicable thereto in an informal talk, previously reducing
such of the instructions dealing with technical questions, as
may seem desirable to the particular trial judge, to writing,
must inevitably aid in the production of a just verdict.
Many trial judges, experienced in the art of written instructions, would probably continue that method. Others
would find the use of oral instructions, or a combination of
oral and written instructions, more satisfactory.
If the main object in trial procedure is to form a record
that will best withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court,
then written instructions are probably safer. If the chief purpose is to obtain a just verdict, then unshackle the trial judge,
restore his common law powers, and give him some discretion
in conducting his court.
The particular proposed rules which I have discussed,
when adopted, will represent the combined wisdom of the
United States Supreme Court and its able Advisory Committee. They received the endorsement of the American Bar Association at its recent meeting. They have proven their worth
by many years of application in the English and Federal courts
and the courts of many of our states.
How then can we benefit by some of these rules, backed
by such a wealth of experience and so ably sponsored, and at
the same time restore to the trial judge some of his ancient
functions? The answer is simple. Let our Supreme Court
continue its good work, begun by it in the adoption of rule
14b, which provides: "The rules governing comments by
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district judges on evidence shall be those now in force in the
United States district courts," by going further and adopting
rules providing in effect that the trial judge, in his discretion,
may limit the examination of prospective jurors to such questions as he shall propound; and that instructions must be
given at the conclusion of the arguments and may be either
oral or written. This the Supreme Court may do, by virtue
of either its inherent or statutory powers, under the authority
of Walton v. Walton, 86 C. 1, and Kolman v. People, 89 C. 8.
While probably not within the scope of this paper, I may
mention another minor difference, that of some $6,000 per
year, in the salary of a Federal District Judge and a state District Judge. This association has done much tending to the
correction of some of this inequality. Now that the depression is over, it should continue the good work in an effort to
obtain concrete results. I do not apprehend any dissent from
the state judges on this point.

PREPARATION OF WILLS--THE INVESTMENT
CLAUSE
By C. E. KETTERING, Judge of the County Court,
City and County of Denver
This article is intended to direct the attention of lawyers
and others (see People vs. Anthony Jersin, -

Colo. -,

not

yet reported), who are drafting wills, to a common omission
which in many cases is resulting in estates being administered
contrary to a testator's intention in a material respect. I refer
to the necessity of the lawyer (in the event it happens to be a
lawyer) advising the testator of the law relating to the investment of estate funds.
The problem, if discussed with the testator, is extremely
simple; if not, is frequently most perplexing to the executor
and beneficiaries, with serious and unnecessary disputes and
uncertainties as to the duty and extent of discretion of the
executor in disposing of stocks and other "non-legal" investments which may comprise the assets of the estate.
The lawyer should discuss the problem with the testator.
He should explain that if the will is silent on the subject, this
makes it the duty of the executor to proceed with reasonable
dispatch to liquidate all "non-legal" investments and reinvest

